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incurred the loss of around 5,000 British seamen (mostly from disease) and cost an average of 2% of British national income annually. For social-scientists this level of resource expenditure makes it an "extreme" example of humanitarian intervention and therein intrinsically interesting as a case in which the politics and dynamics of intervention stand to be more starkly exposed than in less costly cases and therein prospectively illuminating for the study of "humanitarian intervention" or "military humanitarianism" more widely.
3 But also, the case has in recent years been rediscovered by advocates of liberal interventionism and of empire who see in the British campaign a positive example for our own times.
Typically, the campaign is represented as a successful, robust and long haul endeavour that stands in marked contrast to the moral uncertainties, weak or fragile political will and high risk aversion of the present. Yet contemporary analogies with the anti-slave trade campaign tend to be brief and the message or lessons drawn or inferred misleading in important respects. There is, then, both a social scientific and a policy justification for re-examining the campaign and its "lessons".
In particular, the case illustrates the how liberal institutions and culture serve to condition the possibilities and limits of such interventions in ways which resonate with recent experience.
The case suggests the need for liberals to use force sparingly and to rethink alternatives to the military dimension, whilst at the same time being aware that these are unlikely to offer any easy "solutions". 
Mythologising the anti-slave trade campaign

3
This first part of the article identifies two-and-a-half "myths" that are apparent in current representations of the anti-slave trade campaign and shows that they offer only partial or misleading insights. The notion of "myth" is used here to refer to a representation of an historical event or episode that exists in the public domain but which is of limited or superficial accuracy when considered in the light of historical scholarship. The first myth is that the campaign can serve as a model for interventions in the present day. Closer analysis, however, shows the limits of this comparison due both to the selective nature of certain contemporary representations and to changes in the character of democratic politics, society and warfare in the past two centuries. The second myth is that the "intervening" Power was solely responsible for abolishing the trade. Whilst several recent accounts focus solely on the role of the intervening Power, richer historical analyses tend to recognise the vital role of the target state. The half-myth is that it was the use of (naval) force -and in particular the unilateral, illegal use of naval force -that achieved the aims. In fact, whilst the use of force did eventually play a key role (hence the half myth), for long periods it was ineffective and ultimately its efficacy was closely related to the development of state capacity and elite calculations within Brazil itself.
The centre-left British Labour politician, Lord Clive Soley, situates contemporary military interventions against dictatorial regimes in a liberal teleological framework in which "the world has been gradually moving towards greater commitment to democracy and the rule of law.... As long as we don"t lose our nerve we may look back on this period as a time when we finally consigned brutal dictators to the dustbin of history". Aware that the experience in Iraq has given military intervention a "seriously bad name" he asks whether it is worth it. His answer is to cite the British nineteenth century slave trade campaign. That too was at times unpopular and "much of what Britain actually did then was illegal": "just change the names 4 and the dates and you could be reading about our attempts to put an end to dictatorships". 4 Clearly, Soley regards the anti-slave trade campaign as an example of what robust, unilateral action can achieve. His account, however, has no mention of the significance of political developments in the "target" state and despite referring to economic and political options the focus is very much on the military dimension.
The conservative historian Niall Ferguson"s representation of the anti-slave trade campaign may be understood in terms of his overarching argument that empires -or at least the British empire -was a positive civilisational force and that the United States should in the present age recognise and cultivate its own liberal imperial mission. In his account of the Atlantic trade"s abolition it is a) British agency and b) military (naval) power that is to the fore: This simple causal logic is, however, deeply misleading. Brazil had in fact criminalised the trade in 1831 but the law was wholly ineffective -in fact the trade boomed as the decade The problem with such accounts is that they overlook the "interactive" nature of many interventions which actually require some form of cooperation -even if this be coerced cooperation -between the intervener and target government (or faction within the target state) and downplays the importance of the political dimension. It is not only that such accounts may encourage military adventurism; they are also unhelpful for understanding the utility of force. The discussion returns to this theme after first reviewing the campaign itself.
The campaign and its challenges
"I fear we cannot without experiment assume success to be certain".
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Foreign Secretary was personally committed to the abolition campaign and government leaders generally sought to avoid the perceived loss of prestige and credibility should Britain abandon its efforts. Also, the establishment of the Slave Trade Department of the Foreign Office in 1821 institutionalised the issue and created a point of access and influence for the abolitionist societies. The question of whether there is an equivalent political base for a protracted humanitarian campaign in the present age will be discussed in the final section of this paper.
The predominant government approach comprised a treaty based naval stop and search regime known as the preventive system. This had only limited success as patrols were frequently outrun or outwitted by the slavers, leading to the adoption of various alternatives, all of which were beset by their own internal tensions and contradictions.
From the outset the government"s conduct and development of the campaign was closely interwoven with international legal considerations. The 1807 Abolition Act had made it illegal for British ships to participate in the slave trade but did nothing to stop ships of other flags. During the Napoleonic Wars Britain countered this through exercise of its belligerent rights to search and capture enemy slave ships and initially sought to extend this action into peacetime, particularly after the failure at the Congress of Vienna to gain more than a nonbinding general declaration that the trade was "repugnant to the principles of humanity and universal morality". By this point most of the major slave trading nations had already prohibited or agreed to prohibit the transatlantic trade leaving Spain and Portugal as the principal perpetrators. However, the unilateralist strategy was overruled by the judiciary in the landmark Le Louis (1817) judgement which upheld the principle of state sovereignty through ruling that under customary international law no such right of search and capture Palmerston"s response to the lack of progress through the 1830s was to turn at the end of the decade from a treaty based approach to a more robust unilateralism. He authorised the seizure of all ships flying the Portuguese flag that were either carrying slaves or equipped for slaving but soon realised that in the absence of an international treaty this exposed British naval officers to the risk of being sued for illegal seizure. Palmerston consequently sought the authority of parliament in order to indemnify the naval officers involved, resulting in the Slave Trade (Portugal) Bill (1839) which also lowered the threshold for capture by including a number of "equipment articles", extending the bounty for officers to vessels captured south of the equator and making provision for vessels to be taken to British vice-admiralty courts rather than the mixed commissions. 22 The Bill enjoyed bipartisan support in the Commons but was initially defeated in the Lords by Tory peers. The "ultra" Tory Duke of Wellington invoked the Le Louis judgement to argue that the right of search was illegal in peacetime unless secured through treaty, protested that the authority to undertake what amounted to operations of war rested with the executive and not parliament, and that such actions risked "universal war" through provoking other maritime nations. The bill did eventually pass but it was not long before the British navy, despite being at the height of its powers, was reminded that it could not simply excuse itself from the wider international legal system.
In 1840 were also limited patrols off the Brazilian coast at this time which generated many complaints that innocent Brazilian ships were roughly searched as they left port stoking further nationalist resentment. In one episode in which a British crew were imprisoned and humiliated after an incident at Campos, Britain responded by sending all available warships and warning of serious consequences should "the subaltern authorities guilty of such outrages" repeat such behaviour.
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However, the Crown"s own law officers could not be so readily checked for in May 1842 they rescinded their support for Denman"s actions and naval officers were instructed not to destroy slave factories in the absence of a formal agreement with the respective authority.
23 Bethell, Abolition, Lloyd, ibid., [92] [93] [94] [95] [96] [97] [98] [99] Bethell, ibid., pp. 207, 204-13.
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Lord Aberdeen, as Foreign Secretary in the Conservative Peel government that came to office in November 1841 was himself concerned by the legal and geopolitical implications of Palmerstonian methods and cautioned the Admiralty that "however desirable it may be to put an end to the slave trade, a good, however eminent, should not be attained otherwise than by lawful means". 25 At this time, Denman himself faced legal action initiated by one of the slave traders at Gallinas for damages to property which, whilst eventually settled in Denman"s favour, took six years to resolve and deterred further proactive naval action. 26 By July 1844 after further naval incidents and heated diplomatic exchanges British naval officers were specifically instructed not to make captures in Brazilian or West African waters without the agreement of the local authorities 27 and, whilst the trade itself continued to flourish, the government"s principal alternative to the preventive system had reached an impasse.
There was, then, no easy option for government or civil society groups. Whilst the preventive system was grounded in international law but largely ineffective Palmerston"s unilateralism significantly raised the level of captures but could not escape the power of the law. Given party-political and personality differences such naval unilateralism was in any case fundamentally unstable, subject both to the electoral cycle and competing schemes of British foreign policy as well as the prospective legal liability of naval personnel themselves.
Whilst civil society groups were vital for mobilising and sustaining public support for the campaigns the specific projects they themselves advocated ended in farce. It is important, however, not to be deceived by the speed and immediate terms through which the trade was ended such as to reinforce the view that one can explain the outcome in terms solely of British agency and the use of naval power. Palmerston"s unilateralism had not succeeded in 1839 and it is quite possible that had the 1849/50 campaign not generated such a swift response by the Brazilian elite domestic political and legal support for the actions in Britain would have undermined the renewed unilateralist turn rendering it unsustainable.
More importantly, however, "British" success in 1850 required certain specific developments within the target state, Brazil. Bethell, for example, states that "at the very least, British naval action could be said to have greatly accelerated, if it did not alone precipitate, Brazil"s own, ultimately successful, efforts to suppress the slave trade" 38 Vitally, however, given the nature and scale of the task coupled with the limits of British power and reach it was only ever the Brazilian government that could ensure the long-term enforcement and administration of the closure of the trade.
Slavery was integral to Brazil"s socio-economic structure and whilst the nub of the system was the export-oriented plantations the cities also had a large slave labour force working as, for example, stevedores, porters, sedan chair carriers, sex workers, domestic servants, water and refuse carriers and some semi-skilled labour. Harsh conditions and a preponderance of male over female slaves meant that the population was far from self-sustaining. 39 The interests of the dominant merchant-planter class in the trade, the pervasiveness of slavery in The question remains, however, of the role and contribution of naval force in achieving abolition? Actually, whilst Palmerston was not wholly right in this particular instance he did hold an astute sense of the way in which intervention (as a mode of force that alters the domestic balance of forces in a third state) might operate. He argued that naval action would counterbalance the real and imagined grip of the slave traders on Brazilian politics and society. Indeed, greater divisions had emerged as the planters had become increasingly indebted to the "foreign" Portuguese traders through long-term finance deals. However, the Brazilian turn is more fully understood through "bigger" themes of interest, capacity and identity.
Given that the British had applied pressure before what had changed by 1849/50? In the 1830s the Liberals were more willing than the Conservatives to suppress the trade 40 but by the 1840s their efforts had collapsed and it was a Conservative government electorally and personally connected to the merchant-planter class and which publicly defended slavery that abolished it. There was little to suggest that abolition at this point was in any way " Whilst the question of "will" can be readily understood in immediate cost-benefit terms as explained below this should be set against the point that the "rationality" of particular choices is itself conditional upon the Brazilian elite"s wider political and cultural assumptions regarding Brazil"s "place in the world", or identity, and the behaviour most likely to realise such a vision. This will in turn be evident in how Brazil engaged with such historically specific material and ideational factors as the international economy, the normative and cultural character of a Eurocentric international society, and the appeal of (and confidence in) "the state" as a modern political unit. Then, the ability and competence of the state to pursue its desired path is a matter of possessing the necessary "capacity".
Within Brazil the 1830s were a period of severe political violence and instability and it was not until the late 1840s that the state had sufficiently consolidated its capacity and reach and had a sufficiently strong government to be in the position to effect its will on such an important and fundamental matter as the slave trade. The 1850 crisis may, then, be regarded as a moment of coerced synchronisation in which naval force broke the impasse in Brazilian politics and impelled the Brazilian elite to concentrate on "bigger" political-strategic issues of interest and identity at a moment when Brazil probably for the first time was strong enough as a state to implement and enforce its will on this question. This can be better understood through showing how the specific decision rests upon such bigger questions.
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The Council of State on 11 July 1850 came to the view that a protracted conflict with Britain, let alone war, would be disastrous for Brazil. Brazil"s commerce would be paralysed and this, in turn, would hit public revenues; the slaves might be encouraged to revolt; the recent period of internal stability might be threatened; and in anticipation of the future conflict with Argentina, the prospect of Britain as an adversary was especially troubling. The Foreign Minister, Paulino, put these points to the Chamber and told the deputies that Brazil had little choice. It was in any case, he said, the traders that profited most from the trade; the planters would simply have to adapt (which was a prospect softened by the possibilities of an internal market in slaves). He argued also that persistence with the trade had led Brazil to become isolated internationally and that in the longer term it would be impossible and shameful to maintain it. Noting that the rest of the civilised world was now opposed to the trade he asked, rhetorically, "can we resist the torrent?".
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Needell is persuasive in arguing that the Conservatives "chose their state over their long-term access to slave labour" through situating this specific decision in their wider struggle for socio-political order. 43 The Brazilian Conservatives had earlier been part of a broad liberal opposition to the Portuguese Court and their allies after their arrival in 1808. The opposition was held together by a common support for constitutional reform to satisfy Brazilian nationalism but at key junctures they shifted rightward and when joined by the restorationists and regional oligarchs of the first reign in 1833 represented a consolidated body of merchantplanter interests.
Their political character was shaped by both European and Brazilian considerations such that Brazilian "exceptionalism" was marked by the need to adapt rather than imitate the liberal 42 Bethell, Abolition, pp. 333, 335-41.
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constitutional and political models of Europe or the United States, with the predominant influence tending to be the European conservative-constitutional right rather than full blown monarchism. Many were schooled in constitutional theory and influenced in particular by the French conservative-liberal constitutionalist, Guizot. The 1824 constitution itself was modelled on the ideas of Benjamin Constant and "analogous to that of the French constitutional monarchy during the first half of the nineteenth century". 44 Whilst the emperor had a "moderative" power which included the right to dissolve parliament, call for new elections, form cabinets and appoint senators, the support of the Chamber was regarded as important for the legitimacy of the government and to guard against "prince and priest". 45 In practice, however, election fraud was routine and the system worked to "ensure the influence of the elite within a larger society dominated by patronage and hierarchical networks of influence". 
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formed in this period but soon lost its intended democratic character as the respective militias increasingly became controlled by local merchant-planter interests.
Indeed, the "perception and reality of state power were probably weaker in 1835 than they had ever been in the nation"s history". 47 The 
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conscious turn amongst key figures in the elite away from the old colonial system so that Brazil could take its place in the "modern world".
The Conservatives, then, had developed the state so as to serve their general class and ideological interests and were willing to sacrifice the Atlantic slave trade and adapt so as to protect their achievements. These state-building endeavours were, however, part of a wider political, social and cultural development process undertaken in relation to a European model that they regarded as both desirable and, mutatis mutandis, credibly attainable. French political influence has been noted above. The constitutional empire was regarded by
Brazilians as a progressive entity that had managed to reign in autocratic power whilst at the same time avoiding the scale of disorder common to the neighbouring republics. Culturally, the Brazilian elite "aspired to be an outpost of European culture and civilisation" and economically Brazil"s "ports were more closely linked to Europe than they were to their own hinterlands". 53 European demand for coffee, sugar and cotton ensured a thriving trade between the two regions and the emperor increasingly came to regard international commerce as fundamental to Brazil"s strategic development. Normatively too, whilst the Brazilian conservatives professed the "exceptionalism" of Brazil"s development, they were unavoidably bound in the wider body of moral-cultural standards that had developed against the slave trade -under British leadership -and which bore upon strategic considerations. It did not go unnoticed, for example, that despite the dubious legality of British actions Brazil was unable to find a single other state to come to its support during this period of intense crisis. 54 Whilst many of the merchant-planter class were more concerned by the trade"s implications for the racial balance and the "Africanisation" of Brazil than for the rights of slaves, the trade did 53 Drescher, Abolition, p. 352, 354.
54 Bethell, ibid., p. 333.
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leave the elite morally isolated internationally and falling behind the standards of the "civilised world" in which they believed they belonged.
The Brazilian elite"s particular form of conservative-liberal modernism provided, then, the environment in which naval intervention could serve as the mechanism or trigger of coercive harmonisation or synchronisation: the act of intervention pushed the Brazilian elite further in a direction they were already moving as distinct from presenting an existential challenge to state or class interests. This may not have assuaged the immediate affront to Brazilian honour but it did break the deadlock in Brazilian politics and society on this question and led
to Brazil conforming to the normative standards of contemporary international society.
Accordingly, it was the extent of historically specific political, economic and cultural complementarities, coupled with the development of state capacities in the 1840s, which created conditions in which the intervention could force the impasse that had characterised earlier British and Brazilian efforts to abolish the Atlantic slave trade.
Myths and Lessons Revisited
Given the political difficulties and operational dilemmas of liberal intervention and military humanitarianism in the present day the ultimate success of the slave trade campaign warrants a fresh examination, especially given that in some quarters the campaign is proffered as a "model" or even a rallying cry. The discussion so far has shown that the question of success is significantly more complex than is sometimes suggested and that an emphasis on the role of the intervener and military force at the expense of the place of the "target" state and political-social developments therein is misleading. The question of "lessons" for the present day may be considered in light of several central themes and issues pertaining to liberal interventionism: the political support base for military intervention, the role of political 27 parties and the question of public opinion, liberalism"s normative indeterminacy, the place of law, and the utility of force.
That the political base of support for the slave trade campaign held up for forty years in the face of limited success is remarkable, particularly given the potential opportunities for an opposition party to exploit the issue for electoral reasons. Kaufmann and Pape explained the duration of the campaign through the fine electoral balance between the parties, particularly after the 1832 Reform Act, in which there was a premium upon the votes of the humanitarian lobby. Slavery issues continued to have a high profile amongst the public and civil society organisations, which coupled with a group of committed supporters in parliament, kept the campaign alive. In the present age, however, despite some close fought elections in the United States and Britain over the past two decades it is difficult to think of a global moral issue (for which military humanitarianism might be an appropriate response) that could have such extensive electoral appeal. The issues of human rights and humanitarian intervention exposed deep differences between the Labour and Conservative parties in Britain and particularly the Republicans and Democrats in the US during the 1990s -even when faced with genocide -where the issue became an ideological battleground over national interest and identity in which Republicans disparagingly referred to Clinton"s foreign policy as a type of "social work" removed from the "national interest". 55 But even for Democrats the limits of support were soon exposed by the withdrawal of troops from Somalia after the loss of 18
Rangers in 1993, therein foreclosing the political possibility of intervention to prevent genocide in Rwanda the following year in which an estimated 800,000 people lost their lives.
Indeed, that political debate about intervention tends to be pinched by questions of exit 55 Michael Mandelbaum, "Foreign Policy as Social Work", Foreign Affairs, 75/1: 16-32 (1996) . strategy and timetables makes it difficult for politicians to publicly argue for a long-term campaign.
There is, however, a paradox between the apparent political sensitivity to casualties in humanitarian missions and public opinion surveys which indicate that, for example, the American public is often favourably inclined towards the use of American power for humanitarian purposes or to prevent genocide. 56 Such findings led writers such as
MacDonald to argue that the barriers to US intervention and imperialism have been overstated. 57 The paradox is readily resolved, however, when understood in light of what, besides the principal policy objective or purpose of the mission is the other key determinant of public support: that the policy is perceived to be successful. 58 In the case of humanitarian intervention there is no escaping from the fact that the specific crisis or atrocities that may trigger an intervention are generally manifestations of much deeper ongoing social and political problems that are in their nature extraordinarily difficult to address and which have the capacity to draw in the intervener ever more deeply. As such whilst an initial clarity of objectives may exist, this is often exposed by subsequent developments as superficial or naïve and the precursor to a deeper involvement and so-called "mission creep". The tension between competing liberal goods highlighted by the sugar duties is not, however, the only area in which liberalism does not offer clear normative guidelines. At the heart of the Le Louis case were the competing claims of sovereignty and cosmopolitanism which continues to structure liberal debates on the use of force as apparent in the case of the Kosovo intervention (1999) in which the debate was framed in terms of the tension between 59 Curtin, The Image of Africa, pp. vi-vii. (sovereignty based) "legality" and (cosmopolitan) "legitimacy". 60 The effect of this normative indeterminacy or ambivalence is to produce a fairly formulaic debate between competing conceptions of the rightful use of force and the principles of foreign policy, effectively allowing the outcome to be decided by political or strategic considerations.
Prominent in the above account of the campaign was the place of "law". Wheeler makes the point that whilst international law provides the "rules of the game" which players recognise, internalise and may seek to exploit, it is still intimately bound up with the political process.
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In this case it is the interplay between international law and liberal domestic political institutions, notably an independent judiciary and a sphere for public legal debate, which creates an extra mechanism or dimension through which international law can exercise political influence. The reaction against Palmerston"s unilateral turn in 1839 and the Aberdeen Act in 1845 shows that whilst in the short-term the executive might prevail, in the medium term it could not hijack the legal process or dominate the judiciary. As such, in political terms Palmerston"s extra-legal actions were inherently unstable insofar as they relied on his own exceptionally robust leadership, could not muster cross-party consensus, and were vulnerable to a change of government. Hence whilst international law is sometimes dismissed as an influence on state behaviour due to the lack of enforcement machinery, when taken in conjunction with liberal domestic political institutions it offers a further degree of accountability and constraint. Beyond this, the legal status of British actions was itself regarded as important given the possibility of legal claims against individual naval officers. Forces and civilian officials would also be potentially liable for charges of murder". 63 In the medium-term, however, the controversial nature of the Attorney General"s last-minute support for the war came under widespread criticism from the wider legal community which undermined trust in the institution itself.
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There is also the question of the "utility of force" upon which there has been much interest in the post-Cold period due to perceived changes in the nature and objectives of war. In particular is the claim that "old" wars marked by state-centric industrial warfare for political goals have been superseded by "new" wars marked by non-state combatants, low-tech weaponry, and driven by political-economic, ethno-nationalist or ideological logics. In the case of the British anti-slave trade campaign it is clear that for long periods the use of naval force was ineffective in suppressing the trade. When the use of force did make a difference was when Brazil was itself emerging from a protracted period of civil-political violence, had progressed in the building and consolidation of state capacities, and had a strong government which subscribed to the "modern state" project and believed that Braziland key class interests therein -had a positive future in the expanding international economy.
It was then, in this case, the "state" and the "international economy" that provided the institutional bases for peace. In the present age the importance of a soundly administered territorial area is generally well-understood but it is clear that the international community (as Peel above) is still engaged in its own "experimentation" on how best to achieve this aim and there is no single alternative to the unified Weberian state, which has in any case always been problematic in the post-colonial world.
As such, it is one thing for President Obama to proclaim, for example, that "Africa doesn"t need strongmen, it needs strong institutions" 67 political rationale, self-perpetuating, and counter-productive as the friction of a military presence incurs political, social and ethical costs. Getting the timing "right", however, is itself an intrinsically difficult thing to do.
Conclusion
The discussion began by showing how current references to the British anti-slave trade campaign offer distorted accounts of the trade"s abolition through neglecting the role of the target society, over-emphasising the role of force, and under-estimating the specific political 68 Rudra Chaudhuri and Theo Farrell, "Campaign Disconnect: Operational Progress and Strategic Obstacles in Afghanistan, 2009 -2011 ", International Affairs, 87/2: 271-96 (2011 ; see also Jonathan Owen, "After 10 years, no security unit is fit to take over from coalition in Afghanistan", The Independent, 12 June 2011.
circumstances and wider socio-historical milieu that limits its relevance as a model for the present age. This is not to say, however, that there are no parallels or "lessons" and in this regard the central theme has been to view these through the three-way relationship between the institutional and cultural character of a liberal state, political conditions in the target state, and the utility of force. Clear, for example, from Tony Blair"s Chicago speech 69 is that the moral impetus for action is a residual feature of liberal foreign policy discourse. At the same time however, the slave-trade and contemporary cases illustrate that liberal institutions and culture condition the use of force by states such as to exercise significant political constraints.
Often liberal interventions lack the resources to sufficiently penetrate state or society to achieve the political objectives and hence the cooperation of the target government (or some other group) is likely to be required in order to fit the target into the intervener"s scheme of things. It was in this sense that intervention was presented as a form of coercive co-operation between intervener and target.
On the question of the "utility of force" the case is informative for both doves and hawks. For doves, it demonstrates that military pressure can produce a decisive moment -in this case the crisis that broke the impasse in Brazilian politics -which in turn pushed the Brazilian elite to close down the trade. For hawks, it demonstrates the limits and contingencies of force insofar as an effective local actor possessing both the capacity as well as the will was required to administer and enforce the objectives.
Through factoring in conditions in the target state rather than focusing solely on the intervener a further complication for the use of force becomes apparent: synchronizing or co- 
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ordinating the use of force with political conditions in the target and in the intervening state.
In the case above whilst naval operations did at times create a political space for action, in the medium to long term political considerations conditioned the military operations. Without this three-way synchronisation of the military with domestic political constraints and with political conditions in the target -lacking throughout most of the campaign -there is a danger that the military asset will be squandered or have unintended, counter-productive consequences. Key, then, is the primacy of the political. The burden of this discussion has been to elaborate upon the residual complexities and contingencies of liberal (military) intervention and the importance of the wider political and social context such as to suggest that military interventions should be undertaken sparingly, if at all.
